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The relationship between conjugality and household financial management has yet to be 
properly studied in Portugal, particularly in what concerns the ways dominant social norms 
regarding gender and marriage influence financial behaviour, power relations and resource 
consumption and sharing by couples. Studies carried out in other countries show that the 
various systems for managing family accounts are related, in a complex manner, to access to 
resources, wellbeing and satisfaction of needs of the different family members. This paper 
aims to contribute to the understanding of this subject in the Portuguese context by discussing 
the complexity of intrahousehold financial negotiations and decisions. It also presents the 
preliminary results of a study which, using data from the 2010 Portuguese Institute of Statistics 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions, applies to Portuguese couples a typology of modes of 
financial management and control developed by Jan Pahl and Carolyn Vogler. 





The majority of people live most of their lives in plural households, typically anchored in a 
couple and sharing common family resources, which have to be managed. Household 
economic and financial decisions are thus necessarily determined, at least to some extent, 
by logics of cooperation and sharing, as the needs of all family members have to be taken 
into account. When a new couple is formed, financial decisions, which were previously made 
on an individual basis, become shared, a situation that is necessarily reinforced with the 
birth of children.  
As individual preferences are often divergent or even conflicting, couples  decisions result 
from complex interactions, involving tacit or explicit negotiation between the spouses. This 
usually leads to the definition, from the outset, of each part er s sphere of decision-making 
in the management of the joint income, in spending, saving or debt incurrence. Those early 
de isio s defi e the rules of the ga e,  and the need (or otherwise) to also negotiate them 
on a day-to-day basis. 
                                                 
* Article published in RCCS 101 (September 2013). 
This arti le as ritte  i  the a it of the proje t FINFAM – Finances, Gender and Power: How are 
Portuguese families managing their finances in the context of the crisis?" (PTDC/IVC-SOC/4823/2012 – FCOMP-
01-0124-FEDER-029372), financed by EFRD funds through the Operational Programme Factors of 
Competitiveness (COMPETE), and by national funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). 
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Although many of the deep changes in Portuguese families in recent decades have been 
thoroughly studied (in terms of socio-demographic and economic aspects, interpersonal 
relatio ships, a d fa ilies  relatio s ith other i stitutio s , the perceptions, negotiations 
and financial practices of couples have yet to be properly examined. This article aims to fill 
that gap. It begins by presenting a theoretical contextualization of the ways in which social 
norms and representations of marriage a d ge der i flue e fa ilies  fi a ial eha iours, 
their decisions regarding consumption and saving, intrahousehold sharing of resources, 
family power relations and individual wellbeing. Then, it undertakes a brief analysis of the 
Portuguese case, based on data from the 2010 Portuguese Institute of Statistics Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC). Although limited in its comprehensiveness and 
analytical depth, this exercise applies the typology developed by Jan Pahl and Carolyn Vogler 
on systems of couples  financial management and control, which is the most commonly used 
typology in empirical studies on this subject.  
 
Household economics and finances: Money, gender and power 
The importance of research on the financial practices of couples has been affirmed in the 
literature (Dew, 2008). Examining patterns of ouples  spending, control of resources and 
decision-making processes in financial matters is important not only to understand 
households  economic behaviour, but also to serve as a basis for various kinds of 
interventions for the promotion of family wellbeing.  
Given the widely diverse features of both the families and the contexts in which they 
operate, couples  financial decisions are a complex issue which has implications for different 
spheres of family life. Hence, it has become an object of study for various academic 
disciplines (Dew, 2008; Waseem, 2004).  
Mainstream economic theory treats the family as a unit whose members act in perfect 
harmony in order to maximize the satisfaction of their needs. Therefore, there is supposedly 
no divergence of interests or preferences within the family, either because there is 
consensus among its members or because the head of the family, the main breadwinner, can 
impose his/her own preferences by transferring part of his/her income to the other 
members of the family (Becker, 1981, 1991). In such a context, the allocation of family 
resources is invariant to the origin or the identity of the holders of the overall income. 
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According to this framework, the fa il  is a represe tati e e o o i  age t  hi h, within 
the limits of the income it has at its disposal, adopts an efficient economic behaviour.  
This is a view of the famil  that does ot orrespo d to a  people s e perie e, since 
the prevalence of destructive or wasteful phenomena such as domestic violence and child 
abuse, as well as the demand for marriage counseling and family therapy, suggests that we 
consider the possibility that family behavior is sometimes inefficient  (Lundberg and Pollak, 
1996: 150). 
It is therefore not surprising that models based on game theory have been proliferating in 
recent economic literature. According to these models, the conjugal interaction is a 
negotiation between two individuals who have their own individual preferences and 
differentiated decision-making power, and thus the intrahousehold allocation of resources is 
determined by the outcome of the argaining  game (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). Still, 
these approaches are also limited by the formalism of their method of analysis which, by 
conforming to a rigid framework of hypotheses, results in the selectivity of the object of 
analysis, making it impossible to generalize the conclusions obtained to various types of 
family or even to the different stages of life of the same family (Pollak, 1985: 600; Lundberg 
and Pollak, 2003). Thus, I share the perspective of Sen (1983, 1985, 1990), who holds that 
the family should be studied in the framework of a qualitative bargaining theory, centred on 
the concept of ooperative conflict.  This approach enables us to take into account the role 
of individual agency and perceptions of the interests, wellbeing, contributions and 
aspirations of each individual family member.  
All negotiations involve the management of individual interests, but in the context of the 
family, one might expect that they will largely coincide, leading to a cooperation rationale 
based on altruism and goodwill. Nevertheless, this does not mean the dissolution of self-
interest, or the disappearance of diverse individual motivations and perceptions, as each 
perso s i di idualit  results fro  ultiple ide tities related to sex, social class, occupational 
status, race and community of belonging, as well as to his/her position within the family. All 
these factors influence the way each person perceives their own interests, wellbeing, 
obligations, objectives and the legitimacy of their behaviour. The perception of self-interest 
a d the per eptio  others ha e of ea h perso s o tri utio  to the fa il  ell ei g are 
determining factors in intrahousehold allocation (Sen, 1983, 1985, 1990). Sen underlines the 
fact that, in some societies, women identify their own individual wellbeing with the family s 
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to such an extent that this prevents them from perceiving their own interests in any 
minimally objective way (Sen, 1990: 126). Furthermore, a ti ities related to the fa il s 
survival and reproduction tend to be envisaged as u produ ti e,  therefore conditioning 
the social perception of the legitimacy of women claiming for themselves a fair portion of 
the family income (Sen, 1985: 197). As such, the relative power of men and women in the 
family depends on the particular social technology
1
 characterizing each community, which 
determines, inter alia, a specific sexual division of labour and stereotyped perceptions of 
effort and worthiness. The stud  of fa ilies  e o o i  eha iours should thus re og ise 
that ale ess  a d fe ale ess  atter for the a  i  hi h de isio s are ade a d 
resources allocated  Katz, : 26). The sources of and entitlements to family income and 
the ways in which it is managed are thus privileged domains for the expression of social 
gender roles.  
In this regard, it is relevant to distinguish between the management of money and the 
control of it (Edwards, 1982: 325). The latter corresponds to the decision-making itself, while 
the former involves the implementation of previously formulated decisions. It is, therefore, 
the control of money that expresses the power of decision in what concerns family finances.  
This interpretation is in accordance with much feminist thought of recent decades, which 
points to (total or partial) income dependence as a condition for the maintenance of 
o e s subordinate social position Lister, ; O Co or, ; Ward et al., 1993), as 
[t]hose in positions with power over others are easily recognized by the fact that they 
control and have access to resources. Resources give power to control, reward and punish 
others  Jarl, 2003: 48).  
However, it should be pointed out that a ess to o e s own earnings, and the putative 
control that results from that, is not automatically converted into power within the family, 
since (as already mentioned) social representations of gender and marriage do determine 
the behaviours of men and women, and may result in practices that neutralize or attenuate 
the conversion of resources into effective power of decision. Hence, it is useful to distinguish 
et ee  stru tural po er  a d ideological power.  The first is the power of domination – 
the power to be able to get someone to do what we want, or prevent them from doing other 
things,  while the second consists of the eliefs, construings, understandings which shape 
                                                 
1
 “o ial te h olog  is here u derstood as the so ial arra ge e ts that per it produ ti e pro esses to e 
arried out,  i ludi g aspe ts related to the se ual di isio  of la our “e , : . 
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how we think about ourselves and relationships; for example, the different roles, duties and 
expectations that men and women are guided into in any given society  Dallos and Dallos, 
1997: 10-11). This is an analytically fruitful distinction since it highlights the fact that, even 
when decisions are not conditioned by violence or restriction of access to resources, the 
social and cultural conditioning of the choices that each person makes determines the 
i di idual s capacity to exercise power (also) within the family. Hence,  
[…] differentials in economic power may be reinforced or reduced by ideological power. In 
families with a traditional division of labour, where wives were non-employed or in part-time 
ork, the ideolog  of the ale read i er i reased a d rei for ed the a s e o o i  
power. By contrast, in households where women were in full time paid work, and economic 
resources were more evenly balanced, the ideology of the male breadwinner still limited the 
power of women. (Pahl, 2007: par. 4.10) 
Zelizer (1994, 2003) has emphasised the social meanings of money, which is highly 
differentiated in accordance with its origin, the uses made of it, and the person who has the 
right to use it. Contrary to mainstream economic discourse, money is not fungible because it 
is embedded in social relations. In this sense, it is also determined by social gender roles; its 
applications depend on who has obtained it and how it has been obtained. This idea has 
been empirically proven in many studies, using databases on household budgets and 
expenditures in societies with very diverse economic structures and cultural and religious 
traditions (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Thomas, 1990, 1993; 
Lundberg et al., 1997).2 Pahl (2000) also analysed the expenditures of British families at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and concluded that women spent significantly more on food, 
clothing and education, while men spent more on alcohol, cars, repairs, meals, gambling and 
holidays. Taking a different perspective, Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996) reviewed the 
literature on financial investments, and found evidence that women allocate their portfolios 
differently to men, preferring lower-risk options. That is to say, in a couple, who earns the 
money and how it is obtained determine the way money is applied and who benefits from it 
(with women tending to give priority to expenses related to the children).  
Gender inequalities in the family have been only partially mitigated by the growing 
contribution of women to family budgets, resulting from their participation in the labour 
market. In fact, women tend to earn less than men on average, given the prevalence of a 
wage gender gap, and tend to be penalized for maternity, which leads them to dedicate less 
                                                 
2
 See Coelho (2010: 58-63) for more details on this subject. 
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time to their job – in accordance with prevailing gender roles – at a time when expenses 
increase significantly (Waldfogel, 1998). Thus, in order to maintain an equitable distribution 
of resources within the couple when children are born, there has to be a redefinition of the 
way common monies are managed. If that does not happen, maternity may bring economic 
hardship for the female partner (Pahl, 2000; Vogler, 1998).  
As regards Portugal, there is currently an abundant sociological literature on the ways 
social representations of gender are manifested in the family and determine the 
organization of family life (Aboim, 2010; Perista, 2002; Portugal, 2006, 2013; Torres, 2001, 
2008; Torres, Guerreiro e Lobo, 2007; Torres et al. 2001; Torres et al., 2004; Wall, 2007; Wall 
and Amâncio, 2007; Wall and Guerreiro, 2005). Taken together, these studies show that 
there have been significant developments in gender relations, although they have had 
non-linear and intricately interconnected results. While the sustained increase of female 
participation in the labour market in recent decades has been a strong factor in social 
transformation, with a pronounced impact on gender relations and on family life, there has 
also been a continuation of maternalistic values, largely shared by men and women, 
[which] constitute a fundamental piece in the system of inequality  A oi , : 63). 
Though the model of dual full-time employment has clearly become prevalent in Portuguese 
families, and there is evidence of growing male participation in household tasks, traditional 
gender roles still largely prevail, which means that women are burdened with a 
disproportionate amount of housework and caring tasks. This results in marked inequalities 
between men and women in actual working time, with women facing increasing difficulties 
in reconciling their professional, family and personal lives.  
In this context, it is to be expected that gender inequalities will also be manifested in the 
sphere of family financial management. 
 
A typology of systems for managing and controlling family finances 
The works of Jan Pahl and Carolyn Vogler are particularly interesting for their contribution to 
our understanding of how couples manage household budgets (Pahl, 1980, 1989, 1995, 
2008; Vogler, 2005; Vogler et al., 2006; Vogler and Pahl, 1993, 1994). These authors studied 
British couples (heterosexual, married or cohabiting, and with dependent children), using 
questionnaires and interviews of varying amplitudes and focuses over the course of three 
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decades. The results enabled them to construct typologies on the management and control 
of family budgets, based on the four main management patterns first proposed by Pahl 
(1980, 1983): management by one of the spouses; housekeeping allowance; joint 
management, and independent management. The gradual adaptation of this classification 
led to an updated version comprising six different categories, of which two correspond to 
the splitting of previous ones (cf. Chart 1; Pahl, 1983, 1995; Vogler, 1998; Vogler et al., 2006; 
Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2008; Vogler and Pahl, 1993, 1994). Based o  ea h spouse s 
access to money and on their sphere of responsibility in household expenditures, the 
typology reveals a complex pattern of interrelations between management models, amount 
and holdership of income, and prevalent gender ideology.  
Thus, the housekeeping allowance is typical of couples in which only the man earns a 
salary and gives his wife a fixed amount to cover daily expenses. The remaining income is 
managed by him, and it is he who also defines the amount of the allowance. This model has 
gradually become less common over time. 
In the female whole wage model, the husband (predominantly) hands over almost all his 
wage to his wife so that she can manage it, reserving a small amount for his own personal 
expenses. The wife is thus entirely responsible for the household budget. This occurs 
predominantly in low-income families in which managing the household budget is an 
arduous task e ause it i ol es aki g e ds eet  ith resour es that are i suffi ie t for 
the fa il s eeds. The male whole wage system, on the other hand, is characteristic of 
high-income couples, where the man is the main earner. It may also be associated with 
practices of domestic violence, in which the wife is subjected to material deprivation.  
In the independent management system both partners have their own earnings and are 
responsible for different categories of the common expenses. This occurs predominantly in 
middle and upper-middle income families, in young couples or in blended families. It is still 
quite uncommon but becoming gradually more usual.  
In the pooling management model, the spouses have equal access to common money, 
which they pool, and expenses are the responsibility of both. This is characteristic of couples 
where the wife also earns a salary. It may take the form of partial pooling if only part of the 
income for common expenses is pooled and managed jointly. This is the most usual system 
and has been gaining importance over time. It is also the one that conforms closely to the 
prevailing ideology of communion in marriage. 
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CHART 1: Models of couples’ a age e t a d co trol of fi a ces, accordi g to Pahl and Vogler 
 
Sources: Pahl (1983); Vogler and Pahl (1993); Vogler (1998); Vogler et al. (2006); Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins (2008). 
 
 Housekeeping allowance Female Whole Wage  Male Whole Wage Pooling System Partial Pooling System Independent management  
Management 
The husband/partner gives the 
wife a fixed monthly sum of 
money to which she may add 
her own earnings. She is 
responsible for housekeeping 
expenses, while the man is 
responsible for all other 
expenses. 
The husband/partner hands over 
his earnings to his wife, keeping 
only a small amount for his own 
expenses. The wife adds her own 
earnings, if any, and is 
responsible for managing the 
joint income.  
The husband/partner has 
exclusive responsibility for the 
management of household 
finances. The wife keeps an 
amount for her own expenses 
which is transferred to her by her 
husband and/or comes from her 
own earnings.  
Spouses/partners pool all 
their earnings, and both have 
equal access to financial 
resources. Spending comes 
from the common pool. The 
couple usually keeps money 
in a joint account and refers 
to it as our o e . 
Spouses/partners pool part of 
their individual earnings in 
order to pay for joint 
expenses, and maintain the 
rest separate.  Both have 
their own earnings and 
neither has access to all 
household s fu ds.  
Each partner has his/her own 
earnings, which are kept 
separate. Each is responsible 





The man has the power to 
decide the amount of the 
allowance and larger expenses.  
The man controls the money. 
The o a s po er of de isio  
becomes a burden and an 
arduous task, given the usual 
scarcity of household income.  
The man has the power of 
decision. 
Shared, but the partner with 
the higher income has more 
power of decision.  
The spouse with higher 
earnings, generally the man, 
has more power of decision 
and control. 
Independent. Both spouses 








She has no job or has a part 
time job with low income. 
She has no job or has a part time 
job with low income. 
She has no job or has a part time 
job with low income. 
Both partners in paid 
employment. 
Both partners in paid 
employment. 
She is in paid employment 
and sometimes earns more 




She may have no money for 
personal expenses (she may not 
perceive money as her own; 
she spends it on housekeeping 
and children). Each partner has 
a separate sphere of decision 
over expenditures.  
She tends to reduce her personal 
expenses to a minimum (she 
may not perceive money as her 
own; she spends it on 
housekeeping and children). 
She may not have access to 
money (common in situations of 
domestic violence). 
She is primarily in charge of 
the expenses with the 
children and collective goods. 
She is primarily in charge of 
the expenses with the 
children and collective goods.  
She is primarily in charge of 
the expenses with the 
children and collective goods.  
Equality 
Inequality between the spouses 
in the access to resources. 
Inequality between the spouses 
in the access to resources.  
Probable financial deprivation of 
the wife.  
Gender inequality in the access to 
resources  
Sharing of responsibilities and 
joint decision-making.  
Parity in contributions to 
common expenses; the 
partner with lower earnings 
ends up with less access to 
resources.   
Parity of contributions to the 
common expenses; the 
partner with lower earnings 
ends up with fewer resources 
for personal expenses.  
Gender roles 
Traditionalist: the man as 
breadwinner. 
Traditionalist: the man as 
breadwinner. 
Traditionalist: the man as 
breadwinner. 
More egalitarian. Ideology of 
o-pro isio .  
More egalitarian. Ideology of 
o-pro isio .  
More egalitarian. Ideology of 
o-pro isio .  
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However, pooling of resources does not prevent one of the spouses from having greater 
control over the family finances. For example, Vogler and Pahl (1993) note that, amongst 
couples that pool their earnings, only 39% claimed that both were equally responsible for 
financial decisions.  
Co trol o er o e  is gauged  ea h spouse s apa it  to de ide ho  it is to e used, to 
autonomously spend it to satisfy personal needs and/or to make expenditures which are of 
an exceptional nature or particularly costly. Four systems of control have thus been 
identified: by the wife, by the husband, shared, and independent.  
The level of income and who earns it are related to the way the money is managed and 
controlled. The person who earns most of the money is the one most likely to control it. 
However, ideology about gender and marriage may interfere in the option adopted, as do 
other factors.  
In short, the choice of allocation system is influenced by: income (low-income families 
tend to use systems managed by women); gender ideology or representations (a traditional 
ideology, in which the man is viewed as the family breadwinner, increases the likelihood of 
control by the man); relationship with the job market (couples in which only the man has 
employment, or in which the woman is employed part time or gets low earnings, tend to 
adopt systems managed by the wife); education levels (more schooling increases the 
likelihood of sharing resources and decisions); parental socialization ( ouples  options tend 
to be influenced by the system used by their parents); and type of family or conjugal 
relationship (cohabiting couples, those with no children and blended families tend to 
separate earnings and spheres of expenditure) (Anu, 2011; Burgoyne et al., 2007; Pahl, 1995, 
2008; Singh and Morley, 2010; Vogler, 1998; Vogler et al., 2006; Vogler, Lyonette and 
Wiggins, 2008; Vogler and Pahl, 1993, 1994).  
Gender inequality tends to be less pronounced for couples with joint control of pooled 
money, while it is particularly pronounced in families in which the man controls the finances 
(Pahl, 1995; Vogler, 1998; Vogler et al., 2006).  
Studies carried out in various countries (United States, Australia, Germany, Sweden, 
Spain) largely confirm the results presented (Ludwig et al., 2011; Pahl, 2008). However, that 
does not necessarily mean that they can be generalized to other parts of the world (Pahl, 
2008).  
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Couples’ financial management in Portugal: An exploratory approach 
In a study carried out in 1995 by the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, the 
influence of gender roles on the financial decisions of couples was shown by the fact that 
men mostly took responsibility for managing bank accounts, loans and taxes, while women 
claimed to decide about the running household expenses in lower value purchases (CIDM, 
2001: 59). A few years later, Gomes (2000) undertook an exploratory study on the subject, 
applying semi-structured interviews to heterosexual couples, and also concluded that 
representations of marriage and gender do matter in the sphere of family financial 
management. Older couples tended to use more shared and joint forms of management, as 
a way of expressing conjugal unity, but this was less common in younger couples or blended 
families (Gomes, 2000: 166). There were also gender differences in consumption behaviours, 
with women shouldering more of the everyday household expenses (food, cleaning, 
clothing) while men took on the expenses with housing (rent or mortgage payment) and 
other associated bills (water, electricity, gas, telephone). This author detected two 
conflicting principles in the conjugal experience: individual autonomy and freedom, on the 
one hand, and family collectivism on the other. However, they never fully cancel each other 
out, as most couples share resources and decisions to some extent (ibidem: 169). Couples  
financial management arrangements are therefore determined by multiple factors, such as 
the level of individual income, the phase in the life cycle at which the family finds itself, 
individual psychological characteristics, practical convenience, social gender representations, 
age, and type of family organization.  
Building on the research done so far, this paper aims to identify and typify the modes of 
financial management and control used by Portuguese couples, based on a secondary source 
of information – the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).3 This survey, 
undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), is a statistical operation carried out 
by direct interview of a representative sample of household units. It contains a specialized 




                                                 
3
 This survey is performed annually in all countries of the European Union, under the generic title of European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
4
 A household  is u derstood as the set of people that reside i  the sa e spa e a d hose fu da e tal or 
basic expenses (food, lodging) are borne jointly, irrespective of the existence of kinship bonds; or the person 
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EU-SILC takes both the household and its individual members as units of observation and 
analysis. Data concerning the household is obtained by an interview to the person assumed 
to be the household representative, while data relating to individuals is gathered through 
personal interviews with each household member aged 16 or over. The survey also collects 
data on the composition and socio-demographic characteristics of households, as well as the 
composition, holdership and nature of the household income. In addition, the 2010 survey 
gathered specific information on the management of all the household income and 
individuals  power of decision over it.  
For the current study, I analysed households consisting of at least one married or 
cohabiting heterosexual couple, with or without dependent children and living or not with 
other adults.  Households with no income and those in which neither member of the couple 
managed the common resources were excluded from the sample.  
To apply the typology developed by Pahl and Vogler (Pahl, 1989, 2008; Vogler and Pahl, 
1993), I analysed data on who earned the ouple s i o e; the a  income was handled; 
the identity of the persons usually responsible for managing the common budget; the share 
of individual income kept separate from the common budget; and the identity of the person 
that makes the decisions regarding daily expenses, expenses on durable consumer goods 
and costly furniture, loans, savings and substantial expenses benefitting the children. Chart 2 
sums up the criteria used. T o t pes of o - o for it  ere fou d. The first orrespo ds 
to one or more contradictions between the responses given by the household´s 
representative and those given by each of the spouses in the individual interviews.
5
 The 
second corresponds to situations in which responses are inconsistent with at least one of the 
classification criteria adopted.
6
 In cases in which at least one of these situations was found, 
the mode of household budget management was lassified as i perfe t  see Chart 2). 
                                                                                                                                                        
that occupies the accommodation entirely, or, when sharing it with others, does not meet the previous 
condition  INE, : . 
5
 This is the case, for example, in households whose representative claims that all income is pooled, but in 
which at least one of the spouses claims to keep more than 50% (sometimes even all) of his/her income apart 
from the common budget. 
6
 E a ples of this se o d t pe of o - o for it  are found in households in which the wife manages the 
common resources but has a higher income than her husband. 
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CHART 2:  Criteria for the classification of households according to the typology of Pahl and Vogler  
Model Household questionnaire Individual questionnaires 
Housekeeping allowance 
The wife (or maybe the husband) is pointed out as 
the one who manages the household finances. 
Spheres of decision on expenditure are separate (women make the decisions on current expenses and the 
children, and men decide about exceptional expenses, purchase of durable goods or expensive furniture, 
credits and savings); 
The wife has low income or no income at all. 
Female Whole Wage 
The wife is pointed out as the one who manages 
the household finances. 
Both spouses declare that less than 50% of their own personal income is kept separate; 
The wife has low earnings or no earnings at all.  
Female Whole Wage (imperfect) 
The wife is pointed out as the one who manages 
the household finances. 
Both spouses declare that they decide equally often for all spheres of expenditure; 
Both spouses agree that the man decides in one or more spheres of expenditure (although this is not a 
housekeeping allowance system). 
Male Whole Wage 
The man is pointed out as the one who manages 
the household finances. 
Both spouses declare that at least 50% of their own personal earnings is kept separate.  
Male Whole Wage (imperfect) 
The man is pointed out as the one who manages 
the household s fi a es. 
Both spouses declare that they decide equally often for all spheres of expenditure; 
Both spouses agree that the woman decides in one or more spheres of expenditure (although this is not a 
housekeeping allowance system). 
Pooling System 
The earnings are pooled as a common resource;  
Both spouses manage the common resources. 
Both spouses may take funds from the bank accounts for their personal use, including from those that are not 
in their name.  
Partial Pooling System 
Part of the earnings are a common resource; 
Both spouses manage the common part of the 
resources. 
At least one of the spouses declares to keep up to 50% of his/her personal income separate;  
Although all earnings are a common resource, at least one of the spouses may not take funds from the bank 
accounts.  
Joint management (imperfect)  
The earnings are (totally or partially) pooled as 
common resources; 
Spouses manage the common part of the 
resources.  
They declare that only part of the earnings is common resources. However, no part of the personal income is 
kept separate; 
At least one of the spouses keeps more than 50% or all his/her income separate. 
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Table 1 summarizes the results obtained. Most Portuguese couples claim to pool their 
income and treat it as a common resource (78.5%); the group that considered only part of 
the income to be a common resource was much smaller (18.8%); and only a small number of 
couples claimed to manage their individual incomes in a fully separate manner (2.7%).  
 
Table 1: Household Management Systems 
How is income conceived of? 
N % 




income for expenses 
and financial 
commitments €  
All income as common resources 
Some income as common resources and 
the rest as individual resource 
















1 525.3 (904.2) 
1 820.4 (977.1) 
Management System     
Housekeeping Allowance 111 3.2 9,951.3 (6936.7) 1,166.8 (640.1) 
Female Whole Wage 







1,131.3 (560.5)  
1,383.4 (743.8) 
Male Whole Wage  










Partial Pooling System 













Independent Management 104 3.0 10,697.3 (6369.6) 1,792.6 (944.2) 
* Using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
The findings show a pattern of distribution that is broadly identical to that of the EU 
countries as a whole, though there is significant variability in specific figures per country. 
Portugal shows median figures in the European context (Eurostat, 2012).
7
 This regularity 
confirms the prevalence of values and practices supporting the pooling of resources within 
marriage, which cuts across European societies, despite national modulations.  
                                                 
7
 These conclusions refer to the total sample of the survey, which is broader than the sub-sample in the current 
study. However, the relative orderings are not likely to differ significantly in both cases.  
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As regards management arrangements, joint management (whether total or partial) is the 
most widely used (64.4%). However, it is less common in blended families, where only 28% 
of the couples claim to share and manage all or part of their income jointly, while as much as 
11.7% maintain their own earnings entirely separate from the common pool, as compared to 
only 2.7% of the other types of families.  
Whole wage systems are used by 29.5% of households, with male whole wage being 
more common (18.7%) than female whole wage (10.8%). Housekeeping allowances and 
independent management show similar figures (around 3%). 
These results are broadly in agreement with those presented in the literature for other 
countries. Still, shared management systems show greater expression in Portugal, while 
housekeeping allowances and independent management are residual when compared to 
other countries.  
The average figures on household income and expenditures presented in the two right-
hand columns of Table 1 also seem to confirm some well-known regularities. Thus, 
housekeeping allowance and female whole wage systems appear to be associated with low-
income and low-expenditure families. This is an aspect that deserves further analysis in 
future research.  
Inconsistencies between answers given by the spouse that responded to the 
questionnaire as household representative and answers given by each spouse to the 
individual questionnaires were found in 33.6% of the couples. These situations were 
classified as i perfect arra ge e ts  as they do not fully comply with the criteria used to 
define each of the different systems.
8
 These situations occur with respect to the whole wage 
(19.8%) and (total or partial) joint management systems (13.8%). Although this may be due 
to errors of perception by interviewees or to recording inadequacies, the figures are 
expressive enough to require further attention, particularly in order to understand to what 
extent discrepancies are due either to possibly dissonant perceptions of each spouse 
regarding gender and/or marriage roles, or to factors of another nature, such as incomplete 
knowledge by one of the spouses of the household s i o e a d/or financial situation.  
                                                 
8
 These types of difficulties in using the typology have also been mentioned by other authors, who suggest as 
possible explanations the fact that the categories used are not mutually exclusive, the fact that some 
individuals interpret the questions idiosyncratically, and the lack of similarity between the classification criteria 
used and the pattern of responses actually given by some couples (Ashby and Burgoyne, 2008; Bennett, 2013; 
Evertsson and Nyman, 2012). 




Based on a representative database of the Portuguese population, the findings presented 
here are part of a pioneering study on household financial management practices in 
Portugal. Although there is a wide range of conjugal income management arrangements, 
typologies have proved to be a useful methodological tool in this area, as the work of Jan 
Pahl and Carolyn Vogler has demonstrated. The preliminary results presented above suggest 
a pattern that is in line with the existing literature in this field. Still, further study is required 
in order to clarify some specific aspects of the Portuguese case.  
Some particular features of Portuguese families may indeed i flue e ouples  hoi es 
regarding financial management matters. Factors such as a high prevalence of couples in 
which both partners are in full-time employment, or the strong role of intra-family solidarity 
in the provision of social protection in the Portuguese context (Santos, 1993; Hespanha, 
1995; Portugal, 2006, 2013) may explain some of the differences in the patterns of choice 
referred to above.  
This is a complex issue, which requires interdisciplinary research approaches, combining 
complementary perspectives and methods of analysis, in order to better understand 
negotiation strategies between husbands and wives as well as to establish systematic 
patterns of relation among different family structures, contexts and arrangements. Such 
paths of research should also lead to correlations between household financial management 
choices and financial stability, intrafamily equity in the access to resources and satisfaction 
with conjugal and family life.  
This research agenda is particularly important in the context of the current economic 
crisis, as Portuguese families are being forced to revise and adapt their management 
practices in order to deal with increased budgetary constraints. One may also expect that 
adjustments to expenditure and living standards will affect women more intensely than men 
(particularly mothers of dependent children) since, in keeping with traditional gender roles, 
women may tend to accommodate more to the constraints of austerity, particularly in 
families in which gender inequality was greater at the outset.  
Translated by Karen Bennett 
Revised by the author and Teresa Tavares 
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